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Appellee, Utah Department of Health, Division of Health
Care Financing, having filed its Brief, Appellants now submit
their Reply Brief.

THE UTAH STATE MEDICAID PLAN IS DEFECTIVE IN
THAT IT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH TH? SUBSTANTIVE
LIMITATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATUTJE.
In its responsive brief, as It did throughout the
lengthy proceedings below, the State Department of Health continues a familiar theme*

Its ideal world) is one in which it is

never bothered by providers about rates, insulated by the impenetrable wall, the flat rate, and its apparently sincere belief the
flat rate is not subject to judicial review, much less that the
Department should be subjected to the annoying task of listening
to a providerfs evidence concerning costs and efficiencies.
If the Department's view of the law holds true, then
indeed providers are truly at the mercy of the government, having
virtually no opportunity to be heard regarding the application of
the rates to them.

The State's answer to providers who have com-

plaints about the application of the rak:e is essentially, "be
satisfied with the rates or get out."

While this may certainly

be a convenient way for the Department to ideal with this problem,
it hardly comports with ordinary notions of due process, much
less the plain language of the statute ancfl regulations.
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Appellant

does not argue with the proposition that the

statute 42 U.S.C.§
ment," was

1396(a)(13)(A), the si-called

intended

to give the states

administering their Medicaid programs.
in mind

at

all times, that

greater

"Boren

Amend-

flexibility

in

Ho\ ever, it must be kept

r

the Medicaid

program

is

indeed

a

federal program, determined by federal statutes and regulations,
and

given

can hardly

the
be

massive
said

that

federal

outlay

it was

Congress'

states totally free and unfettered
duct their Medicaid programs.
flexibility

for

this

program,^

it

intent

to give

the

discretion

in which to con-

Clearly, wh lie states do have some

in the implementation

of the!ir individual Medicaid

programs, each state, like it or not, is tethered to the federal
requirements beyond which they might not go,
448 U.S. 297 (1980).

Harris v. McCray,

There is a responsibility which comes with

the federal match, and when there is a question as to whether
that state responsibility has been violated, can the states be
heard to say that the flexibility granted the states by Congress
leaves the Courts powerless to decide such a question?

Appar-

ently, the Department wishes to confuse flexibility and discretion with license.

They refuse to accept the fact that Congress,

1
Under
current
law,
the
federal
government
and
the
various state governments are expected tojspend $25.9 billion and
$21.3 billion respectively in 1987 to finance health care for
indigent Americans.
Office of Management and Budget, Executive
Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government,
at 5-102 (Fiscal Year 1987).
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by virtue of the statute itself and

its pjlain language, placed

certain "substantive limitations" upon state Medicaid plans and
rates.

Thomas

v.

Johnston,

557

F.Sup.

879

(W.D.Tex.

1983);

Nebraska Health Care Association v. Dunning, 778 F.2d. 1291 (8th
Cir.

The very essence of Appellants1

1985).

claim

is that the

State has exceeded or ignored those substantive limitations.
the

Senate

Committee,

Report
while

quoted
noting

by
the

the

Appellee

increased

in

its

flexibility

brief,
of

the

In
the
new

statute, still recognized the underlying federal law.
The Committee Bill deletes the present
language . . . and substitutes language which
gives the states flexibility and discretion,
subject to the statutory requirements
its of this
section to formulate their own methods and
standards of payment.
Senate Report

No. 96-471, 96 Congress, 2nd

Session,

reprinted

in 4 CCH Medicaid and Medicare Guide, paragraph 24,407 at H780-81
(1981), quoted in Brief of Appellee at 9J

At all times, then,

whatever payment system is developed by a state, that system is
indeed
pointed

subject
out

in

to

the

the

"statutory

opening

requirements."

brief

at

[length,

As
the

already

statutory

requirement is that rates be "reasonable ahd adequate to meet the
costs

that

must

be

operated facilities."

incurred

by

efficiently

and

economically

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A).

In its brief, the state makes mucfh of the fact that the
nursing home industry apparently did not voice great opposition
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to the proposed flat rate system at the tlime it was being considered.

Of course, the nursing home industry has no lawmaking

authority.

Additionally, aside from the njirsing home industry's

position being generally

irrelevant

as to the issue of whether

the plan adopted meets the statutory requirl ements, it is particularly

irrelevant

as

applied

to

the

Appe llants

here.

First,

Appellants were not the owners of Weber Memorial at the time the
flat-rate
reflect,

system
the

was

adopted.

industry,

upon

Secondly]

threat

as

the

of mbving

record

will

to a much

less

desirable, almost punitive, reimbursement ipethod, acceded to the
flat-rate

idea.

The State would

posit,

in essence, that

providers were virtually uniform and vigojrous
for a wonderful new system, the "flat rate "

the

in their support
The State seems to

be asserting some type of estoppel defens b here.

However, Mr.

McFall points out that there was a very re^ 1 threat being made by
Mr. Mason, the Executive Director of the Department of Health,
that a 51st percentile system would be adapted if the providers
did not agree to something else.

Many of the providers, wishing

to avoid the percentile system, then, wer^ persuaded to support
the flat rate plan.

Transcript at 160.

The State maintains

that

"the

Federal

Government

has

permitted States to define efficiency and economy in terms of the
rate itself."
to

the

Brief of Appellee at 14-15.

regulations

composed

by

the

federal

Federal Register, wherein it is stated thatj:

-4-

It cites the preamble
agency

from

the

We have also decided not to maridate that
the states' plans specifically prpvide a definition of 'efficiently and economically operated facility.'
The reason for Ithis is that
the states methods and standards implicitly
act as the states' definition of an efficiently and economically operated facility and
no explicit definition is necessa |ry.
Federal

Register,

p.

56049

(1983).

It

should

be

emphasized

that the comments from the Federal Register do not appear in the
regulations themselves, nor do they refer to a flat-rate reimbursement system.

Further, even if this Statement is taken as a

correct statement of the law, which Appellants do not concede, it
still requires that the underlying

rates are developed

through

"methods and standards which meet Federal requirements."
this circuitous statement
ently

lies

(Addendum

at
to

the
Brief

heart
of

It is

from the federal agency which apparof

the

Appellant

hearing
at

officer's

1Q-11),

as

decision,

well

as

the

District Court's finding.

As was pointed out previously, accept-

ance

the

of

the notion

that

rate

acts; as

the

definition

of

"efficiently and economically operated" for purposes of testing
compliance

with

the

statute,

essentiality

leaves

us without

a

standard at all.
The State describes at length tthe history of the previous statutes as compared to the current statute, yet is never
able to explain away the fact that
standard as mentioned above.
or it did not.

Congress

set a substantive

Either Congress meant what it said

Appellants argue that

-5-

It did, Appellees

argue

The words of a statute should be "interpreted

that it did not.

strictly as they are plainly written.tf

Board

of Education of

Granite School District v. Salt Lake City , 659 P.2d

1030, 1035

See also, Maine v. Thibouto t, 448 U.S. 1 (1980);

(Utah 1983).

Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 485 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971).
The Appellee

cites

Mary

Washington

Hospital,

Inc. v<

Fisher, 635 F.Supp. 891 (E.D.Va. 1985), fo^ the proposition that
it need

not

make written

findings.

While

this

is

a

rather

tenuous proposition in itself, even if assjimed to be an accurate
statement of law, the State fails to point out where its "unwritten11 findings are.
Also cited is Coalition of Michigan Nursing Homes, Inc.
v.

Dempsey,

Appellee's

537

F.Supp.

argument

451

(D.C.Mich.

concerning

and efficiently operated."

1982),

the definition

of

in

support

of

"economically

Appellee refers to the decision as a

rejection of the idea that "federal regulations require a review
of all facilities on an individual basis to determine the impact
of the [rate]."

Brief of Appellee at 16.

should be read in context.

However, the decision

First, it should be kept in mind that

the case was a preliminary injunction action, and the standard is
somewhat different.
claim

that

costs,"
not

"the

Id.

"provided

Secondly, with respept

rates

as

a whole

do

not

to the Plaintiff's
reflect

provider's

at 463, the Court merely held that the provider had
sufficient

facts, nor

framed

motion in a manner which allows the Court

-6-

the

issue

of

this

to address the much

broader question/1

Additionally, the quoted portion of the case,

See Brief of Appellee at 16, refers to 42 C.F.R. § 447.255, a
regulation which

required

that

"quantified

estimates11

be

sub-

mitted when the state made a "significant change in its methods
and standards for determining the rates."
found

that

the

particular

rate

change

!&_.

The Court simply

ib question

was

not

"significant change" in the state's methodss and standards.

a

Keep

in mind that the rate change in Michigan was a relatively modest
amendment to the existing state plan and was not a major change
in reimbursement methodology, contrary to the case in Utah when
the state converted

from the pre-Boren Amendment

system to the flat rate system.
Dempsey

case

referred

The

State next

to

by

reimbursement

Therefore, the portion of the

the

Appellee

has

no

application

here.
argues

that

"th^re

is nothing

in the

record to indicate that the rate was set arbitrarily or capriciously."

Brief of Appellee at 17.

However, to the contrary,

the record demonstrates that the rate setting process itself was
conducted in an arbitrary manner.

The Statte admits that it never

conducted any examination of any facility at the time it formulated

the

flat

rate.

See

e.g.,

Sharon Wasek; Transcript at 690-92.

Deposit ions

of

F. Roy

Dunn,

The State acknowledges, that

it has no real knowledge of the actual operations of any facility.

Transcript at 26; 32; 154.
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As

pointed

out

in some

length

in Appellant's

opening

brief, the "findings11 and "assurances" requirements of the federal regulations are not merely surplusagle.

That

is, they are

intended to require the states to conduct some type of "objective
analysis" which will provide a basis for the assurances to the
federal government that the rates are reasl onable and adequate to
meet

the cost

ities.

of economically

and

efficiently

operated

facil-

Nebraska Health Care Association, supra; and Thomas v,

Johnston, supra.

Apparently

because the flat

rate was unani-

mously adopted, and then approved and certified by the Department
of Health and Human Services, the State feels

it is insulated

from any inquiry as to the underlying basi^ of those findings and
assurances.

However, for the Appeal provisions cited earlier to

have any meaning at all, the provider must |have this opportunity.
Certainly a fact-finder may disagree with (Weber Memorial's contention that

it is efficiently

and

economically

operated under

the circumstances, but it must have the ££portunity to make that
showing.
ingful.

Otherwise, the appeals process is obviously not meanMary Washington Hospital, Inc., supra.

-8-

II
THE EVIDENTIARY RULING
The Appellee

steadfastly

defend^

the

ruling

below

in

which proffered evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and efficiencies was found inadmissible.

Brief of Appellee at 25-31.

Appellee maintains this evidence is totally irrelevant.

The

Because

it is no longer constrained by the pre-Boren Amendment, "reasonable costs" standard, Appellee

takes

the

position

longer need be bothered by any concern for costs.
Appellee

does

concede

that

that

it no

However, the

costs may be considered

in a rate

appeal which concerns "the needs of medicaid recipients."

Brief

of Appellee at 27-28.
The simplest answer to the Appellee's position is that
it is directly contrary to the applicable regulations. 42 C.F.R.
§ 447.253 states that:
The Medicaid agency must provide
or exception procedure that allows
providers an opportunity to submit
evidence and receive administrative
of payment rates.
(Emphasis
regulation

added).
by

Appellee

indicating

brushes

that

the

asicSe

an appeals
individual
additional
review ...
the

regulation

import
"allows

of

the

maximum

state discretion in establishing such appeals or exception process."
and

Because the rate acts as the definition of "efficiently

economically

operated

facility,"

the

State maintains,

all

providers are lumped together, and presumably, the reference to
"individual providers" and the "opportunity to submit additional

-9-

evidence" has no meaning*

Brief of Appellee at 37.

federal agency responsible for administering

However, the

and regulating the

Medicaid program clearly had much more iq mind when it drafted
the appeals procedure requirement.
In general the September 30, 1981 interim
final regulations implemented th ese statutes
[42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(a)] [by providing
for:

A requirement that States devlelop appeals
procedures that will give individual
facilities an opportunity to seek administrative
review of their payment rates.
(Emphasis

added).

48

Fed.

Reg.

56,046^47

(Dec.

19,

1983).

Further, the agency pointed out that:
In response to the concern regarding a
State explanation as to why a provider is not
considered an efficiently and economically
operated facility, we would note that HCFA
regulations at 42 CFR § 447.258 include a
requirement that the State agency must providT
an appeal procedure to address the expressed
concern of those individual facilities who"
believe they are efficient and economical but
are being adversely affected by a State's
payment rate.
(Emphasis added).

48 Fed. Reg. 56,050

(|Dec. 19, 1983).

agency also stated that, "We believe that

fair and

adjustments are implicit in an appeals process.

See also, Mary Washington Hospital, Inc. v.

F.Supp.

891,

906

(E.D.Va.

1985).

message could be any plainer:

It

dbesn't

reasonable

..."

56,052.

The

Id. at

Fisher, 635

seem

that

the

the appeal s process must permit

"individual facilities" the opportunity to seek administrative

-10-

review of "their payment

rates" and to Address

their

concerns

that they are efficiently and economically operated and are yet
not having their costs met, and that, if the agency

is thusly

convinced, to seek "fair and reasonable adjustments" to the rates
"T

paid them.
If an individual provider

is to obtain a rate adjust-

ment, it seems obvious that the "additional evidence" which the
agency must hear includes evidence regarding the provider's costs
and efficiencies.
Even if it is accepted arguendo ^hat the general rates
set by Utah are not in violation of federal law, those rates may
still not be in compliance with the law when applied in a particular

case.

As

the Court

in Mary Washington

Hospital, supra,

stated:
While the Court has determined that the
general rates Virginia has set for hospital
reimbursement are not in conflict with the
governing federal law, this conclusion does
not mean, however, that those general rates
will be adequate in every case. por a variety
of reasons, reasonable general rates may not
be reasonable and adequate in particular cases
to assure reasonable access and to cover the
costs of efficiently and economically running
a hospital. This may be due to some special
fact about a hospital or group of hospitals
that the state did not take into account in
setting the general rate. Or, although a general rate may originally have peen adequate
for a given hospital, it may become inadequate
when
technology
or
other
circumstances
necessitate a change in the slervice being
provided.
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Whatever the reason, the approp riate way to
deal with this problem . . . is through some
In
form of appeals or exception p rocess.
fact, the more general the rate-s et ting system
is, [such as Utah's statewide r|ate system] ,
the stronger the need for some appropriate
method of accommodating particular situations
that the general rules do nott adequately
address.
I f , a t the othe r extreme, a
state fixed a single reimbursement rate across
the state, there would almost certainly be a
need for a broader form of appeal lor exception
process that would allow individual hospitals
relief from the general rule.

(Emphasis added in part). Id. at 903.
Weber's appeal hardly raises the specter referred to by
the State,

in which

"bitter

disputes" will

rage

"over

whether

snowmobiles could be considered a 'reasonable expense' related to
patient care."

Brief of Appellee at 30.

Weber Memorial has been

attempting for almost four years now to make a simple point: that
the general rate set by the State, given the special historical
circumstances of Weber Memorial, including the transition from a
public to a private facility, its special mix of patients requiring extraordinary

care and

services, etc.J

in Weber

Memorial's

particular case, is not reasonable and adequate to meet its costs.
Additionally, Weber Memorial has been prepared for all these years
to demonstrate

that, under

the

circumstances,

efficiently and economically operated facility.

it

is

an

To date, no-one

has been willing to listen to evidence of thf.s nature.

-12-

indeed

The other
regard

is that

interesting

rate appeals

point mad£ by Appellee

are apparently

acceptable

in this
if they

concern "patient care," but not if they affect only the provider.
Brief of Appellee at 26.

How it is possible to neatly separate

the interests of the providers and patientp is not explained.

As

one Court recently held:
Private health-care provider^ caring for
Medicaid patients • . . also have a direct
financial interest in the availability of
Medicaid reimbursement.
In several cases,
courts have permitted providers
to bring
actions to enforce the Medicaid statutes.
California Hosp. Ass'n v. Obledo, 602 F.2d
1357 (9th Cir. 1979); Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.
v. Weiner, 569 F.2d 1 T 5 6 (1st Cir. 1978);
California Ass'n. of Bioanalysts • v. Rank, 577
F.Supp. W+Tt
1347 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. T983).
These cases have recognized that Medicaid
patients and health-care providers have parallel interests with respect
to Medicaid
funding and reimbursement.
(Emphasis
Department
1986).

added).

Coos

Bay

Care

of Human Resources,

In reality, almost

803

Center
F.2d

v.

State

1060,

of

1063

Oregon,

(9th Cir.

every rate appeal case will affect

the "parallel interests" of the patients arid providers.

In fact,

in many respects, the provider has a more direct interest.

It is

certainly the provider, not the patient, tihat must "incur costs"
in providing care in conformance with federal and state laws and
regulations.

It is the provider which must

conduct his opera-

tions in an "efficient and economic" manner so as to be eligible
for reimbursement.

It

is the provider

-13-

that

has

the

economic

stake in making certain that state Medicai4 plans, at least their
reimbursement

aspects,

are

conducted

in

accordance

with

the

federal statute and regulations.
At one point Appellee states thati, "[i]f Weber Memorial
had come to the hearing offering evidence that

it cared

for a

patient group with specialized needs, such evidence would have
been admissible,"

(Brief of Appellee at 28), and later asserts

that Weber's concerns and evidence concern fng the misclassification of a large number of patients is "evenl less substantial than
the previous arguments.11

Id. at 31.

Not only is the position

self-contradictory, but apparently fails td> recognize that there
is a connection between the misclassificati on and the failure of
the rates to meet the "reasonable and adequate11 standard. In
Thomas v. Johnston, 557 F.Supp.
Court

found

it

"highly

879, 893 (W.D. Tex. 1983), the

relevant,"

in

determining

whether

the

rates were reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must
be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities,
that some providers "are responsible for the care of a greater
proportion

of

persons

whose

needs

are

greater,

whose care is more costly than other providers."

and
Id.

therefore
This is

precisely the point Appellant has raised throughout the proceedings below, but which fell upon deaf ears.
Support

of

Retention

for

Judicial

Transcript at 463-66.

-14-

Reviey

See, e.g., Brief In
at

27-28;

Hearing

III
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The State misperceives Appellant'^ point with respect to
the standard of review.

Appellant does not disagree that the

statutory standard, U.C.A. § 26-23-2, would apply to findings of
fact.

However, an appellate court need not apply that deferen-

tial standard to questions of law.

This is clearly pointed out

in the Salt Lake City Corporation v. Department of Employment
case, and is axiomatic.

There would rea ily be no purpose for

appellate courts if they were always required to defer to the
legal conclusions of lower courts.

Appel lee has pointed to no

exceptions to the rule that as to questions of law, the "review
is plenary with no deference accorded the administrative determmation.

Salt Lake

City

Corporation

v.

Department

of

Employment, 657 P.2d 1312, 1316 (Utah 1982)|
Not only would the State have [itself insulated from
judicial scrutiny by its proposition that the State agency has
total discretion with regard to findings 4 n ^ assurances and its
contention that

it does not

have

to hear

evidence

from an

individual facility regarding costs and efficiencies, but also in
its contention

that the standard

of review

is such that an

appellate court must apply the extremely deferential standard to
conclusions of law as well as to findings of fact.

It is

submitted that this is simply not the standard in Utah or any
other jurisdiction.
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IV
CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

arguments

submitted

herein

and

in

Appellant's previous brief, Weber Memorial would again respectfully request that the Court rule that the flat rate system is in
violation of federal law.

Alternatively, Appellant requests the

opportunity to submit evidence to the District Court or a hearing
office, with the opportunity to demonstrate that it is an efficiently and economically operated facility! within the meaning of
federal law, yet is not having its costs met within the flat
rate.

Additionally, Weber Memorial also seeks a reversal of the

previous rulings concerning the classification of patients.
DATED this

\\

day of June, 1987J
HOUPT, ECKERSLY & DOWNES

u\»..

William Dowses, Jr.
LOJEK & HALIj, CTD.

Donald W. Lorjek
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